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Gap between SMS procedures and actual onboard practices

A deck fitter suffered severe burn injuries while attempting to remove a section of a leaking hydraulic pipe from the hatch cover system. The ship’s staff decided to use an oxygen (oxy)-acetylene cutting torch to remove the bolts from the seized flange of the hydraulic pipe. Hot work was carried out on the hydraulic flange without following the company’s Safety Management System (SMS) procedures, resulting in severe burn injuries to the fitter.

What happened

A 23,872gt Handymax bulk carrier dropped anchor at 0424 hrs and awaited berth availability. In anticipation of berthing later that day, the chief officer’s daily work plan, issued that morning, included opening all five cargoes hold hatch covers to ventilate the holds and allow a final inspection of the empty cargo spaces.

At approximately 1110 hrs, an Able Seaman (AB) noticed a hydraulic oil leak on the main deck near Cargo Hold No. 4. The AB immediately informed the bosun of the leak. Sawdust and absorbent materials were brought to the area to contain the spill.

The chief officer, deck fitter, and bosun discussed several options for repairing the hydraulic line. However, the bolts on the flange of the leaking pipe section were found to be seized. As the ship was expected to berth shortly, repair methods such as cold work or cutting the seized bolts to remove the pipe section for repair in the engine room were ruled out due to time constraints. The team therefore decided to use an oxy-acetylene torch to heat the seized bolts to expedite removal of the pipe section. A later investigation revealed that the people involved did not think that hydraulic oil was flammable.

Full advisory at the following link.

https://britanniapandi.com/en_gb/case-study/bsafe-incident-case-study-32-serious-burn-injury-incident-to-a-crew-member/

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Fuel consumed on board a ship requires heating to pump it from its storage to its settling or service tanks. However, some cargoes are extremely heat sensitive and therefore heating of tanks adjacent to cargo holds should be done with caution.

The International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code (IMSBC) identifies the following as heated ship structures: steam pipes, heating coils, top or side walls of heated fuel and cargo tanks, and bulkheads of machinery spaces. A heated ship structure is where the surface temperature is liable to exceed 55°C.

That said, certain types of agricultural cargo suffer heat damage even at lower temperatures of around 40°C to 55°C. When steam is supplied to fuel oil tanks, the temperature within the tank rises and heat is either transferred by a conduction process or radiated from the tank to the adjacent cargo holds.

A significant number of claims have been linked to heat-sensitive agriculture products such as soya bean, wheat, maize, corn, barley, sunflower pellets, canola, bananas, flower bulbs, soybean meal and fish meal. Processed cargoes have an even higher moisture and oil content, making them more susceptible to microbiological activity and self-heating, which can lead to severe heat damage with the feed cargoes.

The extent of cargo damage may differ due to the extent of the exposure period, properties and/or inherent temperature of the cargoes within the hold. Heat transfer mostly accelerates the self-healing process which often leads to cargo deterioration and can result in heavy economic losses to the carriers and shippers. Soya bean, as a high-value cargo, has amounted to more than half of those claims in recent years.

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The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) Maritime Administrator has issued an investigation report into an incident where a Chief Officer collapsed and died inside a cargo tank after entering an inadequately gas-freed space.

The incident

On the morning of 25 August 2025, the C/O on board a Republic of the Marshall Islands-registered oil/chemical tanker was entering Nos. 1–3 P/S CTs to inspect them after they had been washed and gas freed following the carriage of benzene as cargo. 

Deck ratings then entered the cargo tanks to rinse them with de-ionized water after they had been inspected by the C/O. The C/O had reportedly tested the atmosphere inside these cargo tanks earlier that morning and had determined they were safe for entry. Neither the C/O nor the other crewmembers were wearing a personal gas detector while entering the cargo tanks.

Approximately five minutes after the C/O entered the ship’s No. 3 P CT, crewmembers who were on deck heard a noise and, after looking through the tank dome, saw the C/O lying on the tank top inside of the cargo tank.

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Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi group attacked a vessel in the Red Sea off Saudi Arabia’s port city of Yanbu, the group’s military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, said in a televised speech on 24 August.

Saudi Arabia’s national shipping company Bahri confirmed that one of its vessels, the Amzan, had been involved in a maritime incident in the Red Sea earlier in the day. The company said all crew members were safe and that no injuries had been reported.

Bahri said it remained in contact with the vessel and was coordinating closely with the relevant authorities.

To remind, on 24 August, a tanker had been struck by an unknown projectile about 63 nautical miles west of Yanbu. It said all crew members were safe and accounted for and that there had been no reported environmental impact.

Yanbu is Saudi Arabia’s main Red Sea oil export port and a key outlet for the kingdom’s crude shipments. Its strategic importance has grown as the Strait of Hormuz has been blocked by Iran, forcing Saudi oil exports to rely more heavily on routes through the Red Sea.