Loss Prevention Advice
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A Sierra Leone-flagged cargo ship ran aground late on July 24 near the northeastern coast of Crete, triggering a large-scale emergency response and resulting in the arrest of the captain and the watch officer.
The vessel was carrying a load of plaster from the port of Sitia, Crete, bound for Chekka, Lebanon, when it ran aground around 11:30 p.m. local time. The incident occurred approximately 6 nautical miles from Sitia and 3 nautical miles west of Sideros. Following the grounding, the ship began taking on water.
As a result, an immediate evacuation was ordered. The Hellenic Coast Guard deployed three patrol boats, while the Sitia Port Authority sent personnel aboard a fishing vessel. Additional support came also from nearby fishing boats, private crafts and passing ships.
Furthermore, three tugboats from Heraklion were dispatched to assist with the salvage operation. Divers have also been sent to assess the condition of both the ship and the reef.
According to the reports, no signs of marine pollution have been detected, but authorities are closely monitoring the situation to prevent environmental damage. The Sitia Port Authority is conducting a preliminary investigation.
Both the captain and the bridge watch officer have been detained for causing a shipwreck and violating maritime safety regulations.
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The latest instalment of their Good Catch series, revealing an incident where over-reliance on Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) resulted in a bulk carrier and an offshore supply vessel to collide in a channel during foggy conditions.
A large bulk carrier and an offshore supply vessel (OSV) collided in the channel during foggy conditions. When the bulk carrier got underway from the dock, heading outbound, the weather was overcast with intermittent rain. But it soon became very foggy with limited visibility. The pilots normally did not get underway during heavy fog, but if the vessel was already underway in the port area, as this vessel was, the pilots normally completed the transit.
The bulk carrier proceeded outbound in the channel at normal speed. The wind was on the starboard beam, which steadily caused the vessel to be set to its port side. Neither the pilot nor the bridge team had recognized this at the time.
The Master was on the phone with the vessel manager and was relying entirely on the pilot for the vessel’s navigation. The rest of the bridge team was distracted by the fog and the lack of visual references, and the pilot was distracted by another pilot on the radio asking about the fog. Meanwhile, an OSV was inbound in the channel. It had a pilot onboard and was proceeding along the starboard side of the channel.
The port had a functioning Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) that monitored all vessel traffic and provided information to vessels transiting within the port. The VTS did not direct vessel traffic but would typically contact a vessel if it appeared to be off course or heading into shallow water. The VTS was generally regarded as attentive and helpful, relaying good and timely information. Based on radar and the electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS), the pilot on the OSV recognized that the bulk carrier was being set onto his side of the channel, but he did not say anything.
He assumed the pilot on the bulk carrier would alter course to bring the vessel back to the starboard side of the channel, especially since the bulk carrier was approaching a right turn in the channel. Additionally, he assumed the VTS would say something to the bulk carrier that would cause it to move back to its side of the channel.
The Master of the OSV independently recognized that the bulk carrier was moving into his side of the channel. He discussed his concern with his pilot. The pilot indicated he was aware of the outbound bulk carrier’s position and would continue to monitor it. Unfortunately, the VTS did not raise any concerns as the two vessels approached each other, and the bulk carrier did not alter course.
As the two vessels were entering the turn in the channel, it became apparent that a collision was imminent. The Master and pilot on the OSV simultaneously ordered full starboard rudder and full power to avoid a collision. But those actions were too late, and the bulk carrier and OSV collided in the turn in the channel.
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The new security measures come into force in Russia in respect of the vessels arriving from foreign ports.
The articles published by the media may cause confusion as some refer to 'foreign vessels entering the Russian ports' whereas correct meaning is 'vessels calling from foreign ports'.
The Decree No.502 dated 21.07.2025 by the President of the Russian Federation [the Decree] on the features of vessels' calls at the seaports of the Russian Federation, with translation into English.
In accordance with the Decree, the Harbour Masters of all Russian ports must notify the Federal Security Services (FSB) about the vessels' calls in order to get the respective approval from FSB for the vessel to enter the port.
If the authorization from FSB is pending, the Harbour Master will give a 24-hour advance notice to the vessel (Owners / agents) that the vessel cannot be included in traffic / mooring plan / port line up and operations are not allowed yet.
If the port call of a particular vessel is not granted from FSB, the Harbour Master will notify the Vessel (Owners / agents) and traffic control that the vessel is not allowed to call at the port.
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The use of jumbo bags (FIBCs) to certain bulk cargoes presents distinct challenges.
As explained, jumbo bags, also known as Flexible Intermediate Bulk Containers (FIBCs), are industrial containers designed for bulk materials. They typically hold 500 kg to 3,000 kg, come in various sizes and shapes, and are constructed from woven polypropylene with an inner polyethylene layer. FIBCs must comply with standards like ISO 21898, specifying details such as their maximum compressive load and safe stacking height to prevent overloading. Higher stacks experience greater acceleration forces during transport. If hazardous goods are involved, it should be checked if they are certified for such goods.
Key risks
- Cause uneven load distribution and reduced stack stability when bags deform or settle unevenly; bag rupture can destabilise the entire stow. Risk increases for Group A cargoes loaded above FMP.
- Shift during heavy weather if not properly shored or chocked, as bags move to fill voids; shifting on multiple decks can cause a severe list.
- Fail due to compromised bag integrity from rough handling or excessive top weight, leading to spillage, contamination, and product loss.
- Release toxic or flammable gases from certain chemical cargoes; many gases cannot be detected by standard 4-gas monitors (e.g., ferrosilicon may require detectors for hydrogen, phosphine, and arsine).
- Trap heat and increase fire risk when self-heating cargoes (e.g., copper concentrates) are bagged.
- Overload bottom bags and reduce stability by exceeding the FIBC stacking limit or ignoring the cargo’s compaction characteristics.
- Ignite from external sources like discarded cigarettes, which can set fire to bag packaging and release toxic fumes.
- React dangerously or contaminate other cargoes when incompatible or misdeclared chemicals are loaded together in the same hold.
- Misapply the regulatory code by using bags to avoid IMSBC requirements; in such cases, the IMDG Code applies, and a proper dangerous goods declaration is required.