EU 18th Sanctions Package
On July 18, 2025, the EU adopted the 18th sanctions package against Russia. These measures can be found in amended Regulation (EU) 833/2014 and Regulation (EU) 269/2014.
The EU Commission has issued a press release regarding these new measures.
They can be summarized as follows: New Vessel and Asset Freeze Listings 105 vessels have been banned from accessing EU ports or receiving maritime or other services for being part of the Russian “shadow fleet” (Article 3s of EU Regulation 833/2014). The EU has removed three LNG (liquified natural gas) tankers operated by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines from this list after receiving assurances that they will not transport gas from the Russian Yamal and Arctic 2 projects. 14 individuals and 41 entities have been designated and added to the EU sanctions list (and therefore subject to an asset freeze), including those associated with Coral Energy/2Rivers Group (which is already subject to UK asset freeze restrictions), and Nayara Energy Limited (an Indian refinery in which Rosneft has a major shareholding).
Full advisory at the following link.
Maritime security brief reveals increased targeting of transport infrastructure, escalating regional instability and persistent threats in key shipping corridors.
Explosive threats in the Black Sea
On 22 July, a maritime mine detonated beneath the Liberian-flagged vessel M/V PEGASUS SKY near the Bystre Canal, a key Ukrainian export route. This incident reinforces the persistent danger posed by drifting or deliberately placed mines in contested waters—especially in Ukraine’s Danube Delta and key Black Sea approaches. Notably, this event marks the 26th maritime mine incident in the region since the full-scale invasion began.
Simultaneously, Russian warships conducted aggressive manoeuvres in the Baltic Sea, culminating in the interception of a Finnish Border Guard vessel. Though resolved without injury, the incident underscores heightened maritime friction in NATO-adjacent waters.
Cyber sabotage targeting U.S. transportation
In a parallel front, cybersecurity took centre stage. On 26 July, pro-Russian group Solntsepek, previously affiliated with Killnet, launched sustained DDoS attacks against U.S. transportation entities including CSX, Amtrak, and Port of Houston. This campaign continues a trend of ideologically driven cyber operations designed to disrupt key logistics infrastructure in retaliation for perceived NATO provocations.
The increasing frequency and ambition of these cyber-attacks reinforces the need for robust digital resilience across the maritime supply chain. Dryad Global advises all operators to assess their exposure to both physical and cyber threats—particularly as geopolitical tensions remain elevated.
A Sierra Leone-flagged cargo ship ran aground late on July 24 near the northeastern coast of Crete, triggering a large-scale emergency response and resulting in the arrest of the captain and the watch officer.
The vessel was carrying a load of plaster from the port of Sitia, Crete, bound for Chekka, Lebanon, when it ran aground around 11:30 p.m. local time. The incident occurred approximately 6 nautical miles from Sitia and 3 nautical miles west of Sideros. Following the grounding, the ship began taking on water.
As a result, an immediate evacuation was ordered. The Hellenic Coast Guard deployed three patrol boats, while the Sitia Port Authority sent personnel aboard a fishing vessel. Additional support came also from nearby fishing boats, private crafts and passing ships.
Furthermore, three tugboats from Heraklion were dispatched to assist with the salvage operation. Divers have also been sent to assess the condition of both the ship and the reef.
According to the reports, no signs of marine pollution have been detected, but authorities are closely monitoring the situation to prevent environmental damage. The Sitia Port Authority is conducting a preliminary investigation.
Both the captain and the bridge watch officer have been detained for causing a shipwreck and violating maritime safety regulations.
The latest instalment of their Good Catch series, revealing an incident where over-reliance on Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) resulted in a bulk carrier and an offshore supply vessel to collide in a channel during foggy conditions.
A large bulk carrier and an offshore supply vessel (OSV) collided in the channel during foggy conditions. When the bulk carrier got underway from the dock, heading outbound, the weather was overcast with intermittent rain. But it soon became very foggy with limited visibility. The pilots normally did not get underway during heavy fog, but if the vessel was already underway in the port area, as this vessel was, the pilots normally completed the transit.
The bulk carrier proceeded outbound in the channel at normal speed. The wind was on the starboard beam, which steadily caused the vessel to be set to its port side. Neither the pilot nor the bridge team had recognized this at the time.
The Master was on the phone with the vessel manager and was relying entirely on the pilot for the vessel’s navigation. The rest of the bridge team was distracted by the fog and the lack of visual references, and the pilot was distracted by another pilot on the radio asking about the fog. Meanwhile, an OSV was inbound in the channel. It had a pilot onboard and was proceeding along the starboard side of the channel.
The port had a functioning Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) that monitored all vessel traffic and provided information to vessels transiting within the port. The VTS did not direct vessel traffic but would typically contact a vessel if it appeared to be off course or heading into shallow water. The VTS was generally regarded as attentive and helpful, relaying good and timely information. Based on radar and the electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS), the pilot on the OSV recognized that the bulk carrier was being set onto his side of the channel, but he did not say anything.
He assumed the pilot on the bulk carrier would alter course to bring the vessel back to the starboard side of the channel, especially since the bulk carrier was approaching a right turn in the channel. Additionally, he assumed the VTS would say something to the bulk carrier that would cause it to move back to its side of the channel.
The Master of the OSV independently recognized that the bulk carrier was moving into his side of the channel. He discussed his concern with his pilot. The pilot indicated he was aware of the outbound bulk carrier’s position and would continue to monitor it. Unfortunately, the VTS did not raise any concerns as the two vessels approached each other, and the bulk carrier did not alter course.
As the two vessels were entering the turn in the channel, it became apparent that a collision was imminent. The Master and pilot on the OSV simultaneously ordered full starboard rudder and full power to avoid a collision. But those actions were too late, and the bulk carrier and OSV collided in the turn in the channel.