Loss Prevention Advice
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A guidance regarding the management of catfines in marine fuels, emphasizing best practices to minimize wear and ensure operational diligence.
As explained, catfines, short for catalytic fines, are “left behind” microscopic particles comprising Aluminium Oxide (Al₂O₃) and Silicon Oxides (SiO₂) from the zeolite catalysts which are added to the catalytic cracking process utilized in crude oil refineries. The presence of catfines in fuels have been associated with damage to not only engine cylinder liners and pistons, but also to components in the fuel system such as injectors, fuel pumps and valves.
As these catalysts are expensive, refineries attempt to recover and reuse them, until recovery is no longer economically feasible.
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Are conventional bulk carriers suitable to carry containers? This question has been raised by several industry bodies and in this article, we will look at the technical and legal implications of such conversions. Carriage of containers on bulk carriers is a hot topic, and careful planning and preparation is necessary to ensure the safety of the crew, ship and cargo.
Structural strength
The main deck and hatch cover on modern bulk carriers usually have a structural capacity of around 2.0 to 2.5 t/m2 of uniformly distributed load (UDL). The challenge is that the main deck and the hatch covers are not designed to take the point loads from the containers and the cargo securing equipment. Local supporting structures for the container socket and/or other lashing devices must be considered. In addition, the transverse and longitudinal hatch cover stoppers may need to be modified.
Bulk carrier cargo holds are designed for large loads from bulk cargo, and the overall strength is more than sufficient to carry the relatively light containers. However, the same challenge with point loads as for the deck and hatch covers applies.
Stability documentation
If the containers are stowed in the holds only, the existing stability calculation and resulting metacentric height (GM) limit curve covers the transport of containers. The loading condition with containers must comply with existing stability limits.
When containers are carried on deck, compliance with applicable stability and longitudinal strength criteria in deck cargo loading conditions must be shown in updated/amended stability manuals. In general, intact GM limit curves shall be recalculated considering the additional wind profile area from the containers.
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Enclosed spaces aboard ships—such as cargo holds, ballast tanks, cofferdams, double bottoms, and duct keels—are routinely cited as major causes of fatalities in the maritime sector. The atmosphere within these spaces can rapidly become lethal due to a host of hidden hazards, most critically: oxygen depletion (often caused by oxidation, rust, or biological activity), oxygen enrichment, or the presence of toxic (e.g., hydrogen sulphide, carbon monoxide) or flammable gases. Tragically, a large percentage of these accidents involve not the original entrant, but the subsequent rescuers who attempt to retrieve the initial casualty without following proper safety protocols, highlighting the paramount need for stringent, updated procedures. The IMO's revision of these recommendations is a direct response to the continued, preventable loss of life that results from these dangerous environments.
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A single loose wire on the containership Dali caused an electrical blackout that led to the giant vessel veering and contacting the nearby Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, which then collapsed, killing six highway workers.
At a public meeting at NTSB headquarters, investigators said the loose wire in the ship’s electrical system caused a breaker to unexpectedly open - beginning a sequence of events that led to two vessel blackouts and a loss of both propulsion and steering near the 2.37-mile-long Key Bridge on March 26, 2024. Investigators found that wire-label banding prevented the wire from being fully inserted into a terminal block spring-clamp gate, causing an inadequate connection.
After the initial blackout, the Dali’s heading began swinging to starboard toward Pier 17 of the Key Bridge. Investigators found that the pilots and the bridge team attempted to change the vessel’s trajectory, but the loss of propulsion so close to the bridge rendered their actions ineffective. A substantial portion of the bridge subsequently collapsed into the river, and portions of the pier, deck and truss spans collapsed onto the vessel’s bow and forwardmost container bays.
A seven-person road maintenance crew and one inspector were on the bridge when the vessel struck. Six of the highway workers died. The NTSB found that the quick actions of the Dali pilots, shoreside dispatchers and the Maryland Transportation Authority to stop bridge traffic prevented greater loss of life.