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Drug trafficking presents a particular maritime security challenge because a vessel does not need to be attacked or hijacked to become part of a criminal operation.

Ships, cargoes and legitimate supply chains may be exploited without the knowledge of the company, Master or crew, while in other cases criminals may seek assistance from individuals who already have authorized access onboard. Drugs and other contraband may be concealed inside containers or cargo, placed in stores or ship spaces, or attached externally to the hull or underwater fittings. Criminals may also gain unauthorized access while the vessel is in port, placing packages onboard for recovery at another location.

The consequences can be serious. Discovery of illicit substances may result in vessel detention, investigation, operational disruption and potential legal consequences for seafarers, including those with no involvement in the trafficking operation.

The threat may come from within

One of the factors that makes drug trafficking particularly difficult to prevent is that not every case involves an unknown intruder. Crew members, contractors, stevedores or other individuals with legitimate access to the vessel may be approached, bribed, threatened or, in some cases, knowingly involved.

The security threat may therefore come from someone who is authorized to be onboard. For companies, Masters and Ship Security Officers, this makes awareness of local trafficking patterns and port-specific risks particularly important. Crew members should also understand that unusual approaches, requests, behaviour or attempts to gain access to restricted areas should be reported without hesitation.

Reducing opportunities for concealment

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Stowaway incidents may be relatively limited in number, but their consequences can be significant for both the vessel and those involved.

Beyond the immediate security concern, they can create operational disruption, reporting and immigration complications, additional costs and challenging welfare considerations for the crew and company.

Effective prevention therefore depends on access control, situational awareness and careful preparation throughout the port stay.

A stowaway is rarely a problem that begins during the voyage. By the time an unauthorized person is discovered onboard, the opportunity to prevent the incident has usually been missed. The person may have gained access during cargo operations, through an inadequately monitored access point or by exploiting a period when the vessel was particularly busy.

Once the vessel has sailed, what might have been a relatively straightforward prevention issue can quickly become a complex operational, legal and financial matter. For ship management companies and crews, prevention should therefore remain the priority.

Recent industry updates show that stowaway risk remains a persistent concern, particularly in West African ports. A significant number of cases during 2025 and highlighted the continuing exposure of vessels trading in the region, while Skuld also pointed to an increase in incidents despite the wider implementation of the ISPS Code.

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Assureds whose vessels trade to India should be aware of the Merchant Shipping (Regulation of Entry of Ships into Coastal Waters) Rules, 2026, which were published by the Indian Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways on 16 September 2026 and came into force upon publication. These Rules replace the previous 2012 regulations and introduce an expanded regulatory framework for vessels operating in Indian coastal waters.

One of the most notable changes is the requirement for foreign vessels entering, operating within, or transiting Indian coastal waters to maintain not only valid P&I insurance and an appropriate class certificate, but also a valid salvage contract and marine pollution response contract with an authorised provider.

Operators or shipping agents of vessels seeking entry into an Indian port must submit a declaration of compliance at least 48 hours before the vessel's entry into port limits. Port authorities are also required to verify the validity of such documentation before granting entry or port clearance.

The Rules apply to all vessels operating in or navigating through Indian coastal waters, irrespective of whether a vessel subsequently enters an Indian port, anchorage or offshore facility. Port authorities have expanded powers to deny entry, detain vessels or refuse port clearance where the requirements are not met.

A list of approved salvors and oil spill response organisations is being prepared for use under the new Rules, however, Members intending to proceed to or through Indian waters should endeavour to comply with the regulations, as there is no official exemption in place.

Full advisory at the following link.

https://www.londonpandi.com/insights-resources/india-salvage-marine-pollution-response-requirements/

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Saudi Arabia has intensified its campaign against Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen, striking oil storage facilities near Sana’a and the port of Hodeidah, while intercepting missiles targeting the area around Saudi Aramco’s headquarters.

The escalation raises fresh concerns over the security of regional energy infrastructure and the wider implications for maritime trade. Saudi Arabia launched a series of strikes on 13 October against Houthi-linked energy infrastructure in Yemen, including the Central Sabaha Station oil depot on the western outskirts of the capital, Sana’a. 

The attacks were followed by a missile interception near Dharan, home to the headquarters of Saudi state-owned energy giant Saudi Aramco, according to reports.

The strikes mark a further escalation in the conflict between Riyadh and the Iran-backed Houthi movement. Before the offensive, a Saudi spokesperson warned civilians to leave the targeted area, ahead of what was described as a major assault on Houthi energy infrastructure.

The Central Sabaha Station depot contains large storage tanks used for petroleum derivatives. However, the Yemeni Oil Company said its storage facilities were empty at the time of the attack.

Houthi energy infrastructure targeted

The Saudi-led offensive also targeted oil depots at Ras Isa port in Hodeidah, a facility previously struck by Israel in 2024. According to The Guardian, the attacks were carried out in 10 waves and appeared aimed at weakening the Houthis’ operational capabilities as their forces continued advancing south, including towards the city of Taiz.