a preliminary assessment of a serious marine casualty in which a RoPax ferry suffered a hull puncture and engine-room flooding after contacting an unprotected turning fender at Holyhead Port, Wales, on 7 January 2026.

Synopsis

At 0750 on 7 January 2026, the roll-on/roll-off passenger (RoPax) ferry, operating its regular route from Dublin, Ireland, made contact with an unprotected turning fender at the northern extent of Terminal 3 at Holyhead Port, Wales. Before backing in, the ferry had turned to port north of the jetty, during which a tug was made fast on the ferry’s port aft quarter. As the ferry made contact, the ferry’s hull was holed just below the waterline in the starboard engine room and above the waterline on the cargo deck.

The damage caused approximately 500 tonnes of water to flood into the starboard engine room and an unknown quantity to flood into an adjacent void space. The crew responded quickly by shoring up the hull below the waterline, pumping out the spaces and transferring ballast to create a port list and raise the damage to above the waterline.

Once the situation on board was brought under control, the ferry was able to continue berthing and disembark passengers and unload vehicles without significant delay. Holyhead Port was closed to ferry traffic until later that evening, when the ferry was moved to another berth and a damage assessment of the jetty was conducted. No significant damage to the jetty was identified and the terminal was returned to service.

Following temporary repairs, the ferry travelled to a dry dock in Liverpool, England under its own power.

Findings

  • Holyhead Port had experienced several ferry-related incidents over the previous year, including contact with Terminal 5 in May 2025, and another in December 2025 that resulted in the ongoing closure of the terminal.
  • In July 2025, Holyhead Port Authority issued Local Notice to Mariners 17/2025, advising that the turning fender involved in the incident was not to be used.
  • Although the ferry’s master was aware of the requirement to avoid the turning fender during berthing, the vessel closed on the jetty faster than expected, likely due to its position after turning off the jetty and the strong westerly winds blowing onto it.
  • The berthing operation was within operating parameters of both the port and the vessel.
  • There were instances of conflicting communications between the ferry and the tug.
  • The tug effectiveness was limited due to its position on the ferry’s port aft quarter. Any further attempt to use the tug to pull the vessel to port would likely have increased the force of the contact.
  • Subsequent inspection of the turning fender revealed several sharp protrusions on the face plate and the absence of a rubber fender structure (see Figure 1).
  • The ferry’s crew had no prior awareness of these sharp protrusions or the extent of potential damage they could cause on contact.

Actions taken

The operator has:

  • Reviewed and reduced the operating parameters for all ferries operating in Holyhead Port.
  • Requested that Holyhead Harbour Authority inspect and repair the damaged fendering on the Terminal 3 jetty.
  • Issued a memo to all deck officers stressing the importance of reporting closing and clearing distances when on mooring stations.

The port operator has:

  • Undertaken a full restructure of its UK harbour authorities following earlier incidents at Holyhead Port’s Terminal 3 and Terminal 5, including the appointment of a new duty holder, designated person and regional harbour master.
  • Removed protruding brackets from the turning fender.
  • Started an improvement project to return Holyhead Port Terminal 5 to service and to improve the resilience of both terminals. This is scheduled to be completed by October 2026.
  • Planned works to include installing new anodes, replacing deficient and missing fenders, and renewing two of the mooring dolphins.

In light of the actions taken and the planned port improvements, the MAIB investigation into the incident has been closed.