In recent months, incidents of piracy, armed robbery and attacks in the Red Sea have once again made headlines, however, Bab el Mandeb transits are rebounding to near two-year highs, signaling a tentative recovery in Red Sea traffic. 

A recent data show Bab el Mandeb transits have climbed to their highest level in almost two years, signalling a cautious recovery in the Red Sea corridor. The improvement is real but modest: volumes remain below pre-November 2023 baselines and operators continue to calibrate exposure against security, insurance and schedule risk.

 

Ocean Network Express (ONE) has announced a fortnightly “Red Sea China Service” (RCS) – a slot charter on RCL’s loop connecting Shanghai–Qingdao–Nansha–Shekou with Jeddah, Sokhna and Aqaba – without transiting the Suez Canal.

The inaugural sailing (SSF DREAM) is slated for 15 January 2026. Other carriers are participating as slot partners, underscoring an industry preference for controlled re-entry rather than a wholesale reset.

Furthermore, how parallel developments point the same way: CMA CGM has begun selecting Suez transits (e.g., INDAMEX), while alliances signal ongoing monitoring and insurers reportedly seek “60–90 days of quiet” before approving broader returns. In short, testing the water is underway; the risk calculus still dominates final routing.

Threat picture: Unchanged fundamentals, episodic incidents

Southern Red Sea/Western Gulf of Aden remain the primary kinetic risk zones. The latest advisories and incident logs still reference missiles, aerial/waterborne drones, small craft attacks and illegal boardings, with misidentification/collateral exposure for ships not directly targeted.

US MARAD maintains heightened advisories for US-flagged ships, including AIS off guidance in the southern Red Sea/Gulf of Aden/Bab el Mandeb unless safety is compromised, and AISon in the Persian Gulf. This dovetails with industry reminders that AIS policy is flag state and company led; the evidence base remains mixed on whether AIS off reduces targeting risk, and post incident support can be complicated if ships are electronically silent.

Industry baselines: The updated MISTO (26 November 2025), to be read with BMP Maritime Security (BMP MS, March 2025), continues to frame risk by capability–intent–opportunity and emphasises voyage specific assessments, registration/reporting, and crew readiness over prescriptive “one size fits all” measures.

Takeaways

  • Before sailing through the Red Sea, ensure that the voyage risk assessment utilises the latest UKMTO/MSCIO reporting arrangements. Register the vessel with MSCIO’s Voluntary Registration Scheme and keep up the UKMTO reporting cadence across the VRA, with UKMTO as the primary point of contact for emergencies.
  • Apply BMP Maritime Security thoroughly. Confirm physical barriers, secure access and lighting, run drills (e.g., citadel/SSAS/watchkeeping/manoeuvre, etc.), and rehearse incident response.