The majority of fires onboard ships start in the engine room and the frequency of such fires is on the rise. Although the main cause of these fires may not be identical, there are certain similarities in the underlying patterns of the fires.
Introduction
Every year fires on board ships lead to loss of lives and severe damage to the ships themselves. Most fires on board ships originate in the engine room where the three ingredients for a fire, namely fuel, oxygen and a source of ignition, exist in abundance. These do not only start the fire but also feed and intensify it further. Fire safety is not only about detecting and fighting a fire, but also about preventing it from igniting in the first place.
In this article we will focus on how these fires can be prevented. We will touch upon some of the main causes of engine room fires and explore insights from our claims data to understand the frequency of such fires before setting out some recommendations on how to mitigate the risks of these fires occurring.
How do most engine room fires start?
A review of Gard’s hull and machinery (H&M) claims for the years 2017-2021 related to fires and explosions on vessels, shows that nearly 60% of all such fires originated in the engine room. Nearly two thirds of these engine room fires occurred on the main and auxiliary engines or their associated components such as turbochargers. The majority of these incidents were caused by a failure in a flammable oil system, most often in the low-pressure fuel oil piping, allowing spray of oil onto an unprotected hot surface.
Case study
A copper pipe that was part of the fuel oil pressure gauge supply pipework for one of the auxiliary engines fractured. Due to a missing metal spray shield the fuel sprayed onto the unprotected hot surfaces of the nearby turbocharger and the exhaust system which had temperatures of more than 400 °C. The fuel ignited causing extensive damage to auxiliary engines and power distribution cables. The vessel was out of service for 40 days to carry out repair works. Investigation by experts showed that the copper pipe that fractured did not match the original design and had a lower wall thickness. There was no record of any previous repairs carried out to the fuel system pipework. The pipe assembly on the other three auxiliary engines appeared to be of original installation comprising of a steel pipe. The spray shield was removed during maintenance and not re-installed. Insulation was also suspected to be inadequate since exposed sections around the exhaust manifold and turbocharger were noticed on other three auxiliary engines. The investigators concluded that the heat shielding arrangements on the fire damaged auxiliary engine did not meet the relevant SOLAS regulations, II-2/2.2.6.1.
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